recent milk over-supply, but one is particAn interregional reactive programming ularly important. That is, the price support A interregional reactive programmig .program has maintained the milk price at model of the United States dairy industry is the milk price at used to test the welfare implications of sev-parity related levels which have exceeded private sector market clearing prices.
eral dairy program changes on milk producPlicy setor t ea wit te srps ers, milk consumers, and taxpayers. The the surplus ers, milkconsumers ' and taxpayers. The milk problem has been aimed toward reducresults showed that each of the tested alter-mi proem hs been ie toward reducing production through price or other innatives (price support reduction, price sup-centiv.
on gre e imina the or her inport reduction with frozen minimum Class I support price adjustment and has effectively price, assessments, and production quotas) support price aus t has effectively could reduce price frozen the support price at the October 1980 substantially. However, assessments reduced level or below. This action was not sufficient substantially. However, assessments reduced expenditures most effectively in terms of cost to keep production and price support purchases from increasing. A per hundredweight to milk producers for the United States gen-A per dredwegt erally while price support reduction with ae ent n all i marketed was legisfrozen minimum Class I price was most efed in 1982. The purpose of the assessment ficacious in terms of cost to Southeast pro-ws t reduce pr ctin lowering producers.
ducer prices while providing revducers.
enue to offset price support costs. However, Key words: dairy policy, welfare analysis, legal challenges and conditions in agriculture reactive programming. generally prevented the assessments from Generally, dairy market regulation has having much effect on production and price Generally, dairy market regulation has support purchases proven quite workable over the nearly 35 During the fall of 1983, a paid 15-month years it has existed in its present form. Under voluntar diversion program coupled with a regulation, the industry has provided ade-reduction in the price support level and a quate quantities of milk at stable producer pe hundredweight assessment was legisand consumer prices. Recently, the dairy in-lated. Although production and price support dustry has produced substantially more milk outlays were down in 1984, both have been than has been consumed at legislatively sup-increasing since completion of the paid diported market prices. This has resulted in version. Several other policyproposalswhich large government outlays through the dairy were discussed before passage of the 1983 price support program. Even though two of legislation are under discussion for the 1985 the goals of the dairy program are being Farm Bill. Among these are simple support satisfied, i.e., adequate supplies and stable level reductions, reduced support level with prices, these large government outlays have fluid milk prices frozen at previous levels, brought calls for reform of dairy market reg-and base licensing programs with restricted ulation. Many factors have contributed to the sales. QIi is quantity'of Grade A milk consumed a single period reactive programming model in fluid products in region i, of the United States dairy industry was conPli is farm level fluid milk price in region structed (Seale and Trammel) . The model i, includes classified pricing, price support pro-F 1 is the farm level elasticity of demand gram, and fluid/manufacturing milk quality for fluid milk products with respect to conditions and is capable of defining market the price of milk used in fluid products, equilibrium under the assumptions of various QMi is quantity of milk used in manufacdairy program changes. From the equilibrium tured products purchased by consumers solutions of the model, the welfare effects of in region i, the tested dairy program changes were cal-PM is farm level manufacturing milk price culated. Conceptually, the model builds on in region i, the earlier work of Ippolitto and Masson and M, is the farm level elasticity of demand M hfr m level elasticity of deman d
Kessel and is similar to one developed by for milk used in manufactured products Whipple. with respect to the price of milk used in manufactured products, Functionally, the model is:
in manufactured products, QII is quantity of Grade A milk used in (1) QA, = Ao(PA,)Â (PB,)A2, manufactured products in region i (Class II and Class III uses are combined for (2) QB 1 = B 0 (PBi)Bi(PA 1 )B2, the purpose of this study),
QATi is the net quantity of Grade A milk traded in region i (positive for region i (4) QM, = Mo(PMi)M,, imports, negative for region i exports),
PMMw is farm level Grade B milk price in ()Qll-QA~ + QATI Q Minnesota and Wisconsin, (6) PI, = PMMW + CLI 1 , PIIi is farm level price of Grade A milk (7) PIIi = PMMW, used in manufactured products in region (7) PIIt = PMw, , (QIi)(PI,) + (QII,)(PII) , CLI, is the differential paid for Class I milk (8) + QAT in region i, SL is the USDA price support level for man-(9) PB, = PMi, ufacturing milk, (1 0) PM 1 ; 2-SL~, QMTi is quantity of milk used in manufac-(10) PM, >L SL, tured products in region i, (11) QMT, = QII, + QBi + QBTi, QBT, is net quantity of Grade B milk traded in region i (positive for region i imports, (12) QMS, = QMT, -QMi, and negative for region i exports), and (13) QI, < QA + QAT,, QMS, is quantity of milk used in manufac-Q 1 ') QA + QAT 1 ,i itured products in region i, purchased by where: the government sector. QAi is quantity of Grade A milk produced Equations (1) and (2) are respective supin region i, ply functions for Grade A and B milk. Equa-PA 1 is blend price received by Grade A milk tions (3) and (4) are demand functions for producers in region i, fluid and manufacturing milk. The remaining eight equations describe the allocation and ply must meet demand intraregionally (equapricing provisions of the market orders and tion (14)) and for all regions (equation (15)), price support restrictions. Equations (9) is and interregional price differences cannot a competitive pricing identity for manufac-exceed transportation costs. turing milk. Equations (6), (7), and (8) are pricing identities associated with classified pricing. Equation (13) defining their fluid and manufacturing milk TFi is the transportation cost for bulk fluid demands, as well as milk supply relationmilk between region i and region j, ships. Demand and supply schedules were TMi is the transportation cost for manu-constructed for each region using 1981 State factured milk products between region and Federal Market Order price and quantity i and region j, and data (USDA, 1981 a,b,c,d ) and elasticity es-TI, is the transportation cost for packaged timates.
2 The 1981 data were used because fluid milk products between region i and they were the most recent available when region j.
the research was conducted. Although these These equilibrium conditions (equations (14-data are somewhat dated, their use should 18)) are met in the interregional model by not seriously limit the usefulness of results the equilibrium seeking technique of the since many of the economic and policy forces reactive programming algorithm. That is, sup-at work in the past several years were at work .in 1981. Further, conditions in 1981 may equilibrium. Even so, as with any simulation better represent a status quo policy situation model, even perfect model validation using since producers were not adjusting to as-historical data does not ensure accurate model sessments and the diversion program. How-results for different environments. ever, some type of congressional action in dealing with mounting government removals seemed imminent. Demand elasticity paramPolicy Alternatives eters were set based on estimates by Dahlgran. The elasticities of demand for fluid milk Four potential policy alternatives are ex-(F 1 ) and manufacturing milk (M,) were set amined in this paper: (1) a per hundredat -0.112 and -0.352, respectively, for all weight assessment on all milk produced; (2) regions.
a decrease in the price support level; (3) a The supply elasticities were set by the au-decrease in the price support level while thors based on a review of several elasticity raising Class I differentials by the amount of estimates (Dahlgran; George and King; Bran-the decrease to hold minimum Class I prices dow; Chen et al.) . No particular study's es-at current levels; and (4) a quota restricting timates were used, rather the parameter values each producer to a portion of his base prowere selected from within the range of the duction (usually the preceding year or an available estimates so as to model the dairy average of some years' production) while industry's longterm and shortterm response limiting entry of new producers to control to various program changes. In estimating the quantity of milk produced. Adjustments longterm adjustments, a supply elasticity of to the dairy industry model necessary to sim-.50 was used. In the authors' opinion, this ulate equilibrium under alternative policies parameter reflected the price/quantity re-and definition of the welfare effects of altersponsiveness of milk supply over a 2-to 4-native policies are detailed in the following year adjustment period; a period thought to discussion. be the maximum time allowed a particular Assessment program to meet policy objectives before alternatives would be sought. An elasticity With a per hundredweight assessment on of 0.25 was used to reflect a shorter term all milk marketed, producers receive PSi-T response (1 to 2 years). Calculated demand for milk rather than PS, where T is the amount and supply schedules were of the form shown of the assessment. The supply function for in equations (3) and (4) and (19), respec-milk is then: tively. Variation in elasticities among regions 20 S PS was not considered since Dahlgran showed ) i i ) such differences to be insignificant. Transfer
The post-assessment supply function is costs between regions were estimated based shifted along the price axis relative to the on supply to demand point distances and pre-assessment supply by the amount of the transportation cost functions estimated by assessment. With the assessment, the average Lough and Hallberg et al. Transfer costs were milk price would fall and production would adjusted to the 1981 price level by the con-decline. As long as production did not desumer price index for transportation service. dine enough so as to avoid support activity To validate the model, the variable param-and force prices to rise, the assessment would eters were set to simulate observed 1981 have no effect on consumer prices, and promarket equilibrium. These estimates were ducer price would decline but by less than compared with the actual price and quantity the assessment since the percentage of milk data. The base empirical model misestimated used in Class I would increase. Reduced prices producer prices and quantities by 2.3 percent and quantities indicate a loss of producers' and 1.7 percent, respectively. Fluid milk surplus. Producers' surplus loss (PSLi) is the prices and quantities were misestimated by area above the supply schedule, between the 1.0 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively, pre-and post-assessment equilibrium prices. while manufacturing milk prices and quan-Mathematically: tities were misestimated by 1.4 percent and PSia Si 0.5 percent.
3 These results suggest the em- = PMOw + CLIi, where PTSA is the cost of processing, trans-P + CLI, portation, storage, and administration per where ASL is the change in the price support hundredweight of milk purchased for price level (ASL = SL -SL). As in the previous support.
two cases, lowered prices and quantities Lowered price support would reduce producers' surplus as defined by equation (21). Lower manufacturing milk A reduction in the price support level re-prices would increase consumption with a duces the floor under the manufacturing milk resulting rise in manufacturing milk conprice. The demand for manufacturing milk sumers' surplus (defined by equation (25)). (equation (4)) is then perfectly elastic at SL" Finally, reduced manufacturing milk price, rather than SLa (equation (10)) where "a" increased private sector consumption, and indicates the initial support level and "o" lower overall milk production reduces the indicates the reduced support level. Assum-expenditures required for price support (deing substantial price support activities in the fined by equation (26)). Since fluid milk market, a lower support level would lead to prices would be unaffected, fluid consumers' lower milk prices, with increased private surplus would be unaffected by this program sector consumption, decreased milk produc-change. tion, and decreased price support expendiSince Class I prices are frozen, this effect tures. As in the case of the assessment, lower on milk producers in different markets would prices and quantities would reduce produc-vary. If the percentage of Class I use in the ers' surplus. This loss of producers' surplus market was near 100, the effect of the lowis defined by equation (21). Reduced fluid ered support would be small. If the perand manufacturing milk product prices would centage used in Class I was low, most of the increase milk consumption and consumers' price effects of the lowered support level surplus. Fluid milk consumer surplus gain would be transmitted to the producer through ·(FCSG) is defined by: a lower blend price. Producer prices for Grade B milk would decrease by the reduction in (24) FCSG 1 = F(PI)a Fd the support level.
Production quota Similarly, manufacturing milk consumers'
A production quota would limit each prosurplus gain (MCSG) is defined by:
ducer to a portion of the firm's previous PMjCa The supply function is perfectly inelastic at the quota quantity. Assuming QS, exceeds -[(PM? + PTSA) (QMS)].
QSQ, at the market price, the quota results in loss of producers' surplus, gain of quota weight assessment with T set at $.50 and rent, and lower price support expenditures. $1.00, (2) price support level reductions Producers' surplus loss is defined by equation with ASL set at $1.00 and $2.00, (3) on milk producers and consumers and gov-( PS-i emernment expenditures as previously defined (30) PSQ, = (QSQ,/So)si.
were estimated for each of the model regions. PSQi is the supply price at the quota quantity (QSQ,) and thus is the marginal cost of producing milk in region i under the quota. It RESULTS should be noted that this is marginal cost for the industry within the region rather than
Estimates of the welfare implications of marginal cost for an individual firm. If the the aforementioned policies are listed in Taprice received by producers exceeds this ble 1. A summary of price support purchase, marginal cost, the economic rent accrues to government outlays, and welfare effects asthe owner of the quota. This rent is defined sociated with each policy are listed in Table  by: 2. Complete regional results are not shown in the interest of brevity, but regional im-(31) QRi = QSQ,(PS, -PSQ,), plications of particular interest are discussed where QR is the rent to the quota in region in the text. Other regional detail is available i. from the authors. Further, in the following Initially, the milk producer would be the discussion, only the long-term results are disquota owner, but if ownership were trans-cussed except where contrast between the ferable or if quota could be leased, the eco-short-and long-term is particularly interestnomic rent might accrue to other than milk ing. producers. These economic rent formulas are based on an assumption of a perfect market for quota. Quota reduced production would Assessments result in lowered price support expenditures as defined by equation (23). Consumers' The simulation results indicate that a $.50 asurplus would be unaffected by w th ror redued prce support acquisitions by 18 change as long as the quotas were not so reduced price support acquisitions by 18 limiting as to avoid price support activity percent (10,511 million pounds down from forcing class prices to rise.
1981 purchases of 12,861 million pounds). Reduced purchases along with assessment revenue would have reduced price support cost by $1,032.5 million, a 48 percent repecification of Policy Alternates uction from 1981 expenditures of $2,134.0
The various model parameters were set to million, The longer run implications of quota transfer are not considered in this analysis. For example, sale or lease of a large portion of a region's quota to lower cost producers outside the region could lead to higher consumer prices due to increased transportation costs. It could also lead to lower consumer prices if over-order premiums were present.
'The cost of price support includes purchase, storage, transport, and processing costs. Revenue from the sale of stocks is not included. The resource misallocation and reallocation which results from dairy market intervention, both price support and market order, are not addressed in this paper. [16.8%] aFCSG=fluid milk consumers' surplus gain; MCSG=manufactured product consumers' surplus gain; PSL=producers' surplus loss. The numbers in brackets represent the gain (loss) in consumers' (producers') surplus as a percent of consumer (producer) expenditure (revenue).
bQR-quota rent. The numbers in brackets represent the quota rent as a percent of producers' revenue.
-Since production is at the limit of the quota, the producer operates on the perfectly inelastice portion of his supply schedule. Thus, the elasticity on the more elastic portion does not affect equilibrium.
dConsumer prices were unaffected by these program changes; thus, FCSG and MCSG equal zero.
million. A $1.00 assessment would have rePrice Support Reduction duced support acquisitions by 37 percent. Price support expenditures would have fallen
The simulation solutions indicate that a to $72.2 million, a savings of $2,061.8 mil-100 reduction in the support level would lion, and producers' surplus would have fallen have reduced price support purchases by 56 by 7.1 percent of producers' revenue. The percent (5,707 million pounds down from sum of the welfare impacts is $777.6 million. 1981 purchases of 12,861 million pounds, As expected, surplus loss as a percentage of Table 2 ). Similarly, price support expendirevenue varies little across regions since the ture would have totaled $889.8 million, a tax is applied to each hundredweight of milk $1,244.2 million savings over 1981 expendmarketed.
itures of $2,134.0 million (USDA, 1982). Fluid and manufactured product consumers reflect the effect of a support level change. would have netted surplus gains of $535.1 However, in regions with little Class II or III million and $607.8 million, respectively, Ta-utilization, Class I prices may not adjust with ble 1. The support level reduction would support level changes since an added prehave lowered producers' surplus $1,225.5 mium may be necessary to meet Class I demillion (6.7 percent of producers' surplus). mand in the market. If this was the case (the The simple sum of gains and losses was Class I price does not follow the M-W price $1,161.6 million. Since consumers' gains in each region), this model may overestimate nearly offset producers' losses, the simple FCSG and PSL. net effect of the policy was approximately equal to the savings in support outlays.
A $1.74 reduction in the support level Price Support Reduction With would have eliminated the need for price Frozen Class I Price support purchases in the long run, reducing support outlays to zero, Table 2 . Such a re-A $1.00 reduction in the support price duction would have increased fluid and man-coupled with frozen minimum Class I prices ufactured products consumers' surplus by would have reduced annual price support amounts equal to about 12 percent of con-acquisitions to 7,200 million pounds and sumer expenditures. Producers would have expenditures to $1,222.6 million, respective suffered a surplus loss equaling 11.5 percent reductions of 44 and 47 percent from 1981 of producers' revenue. Again, the simple net levels, Table 2 . Manufactured milk product effect of the policy was about equal to the consumers' surplus would have increased by savings in support outlays. In the interme-$748.4 million which accounts for about 7 diate run, a $2.00 reduction in the support percent of consumer expenditures, Table 1 . level would have reduced support purchases Milk producers' surplus would have been to 2,904 million pounds rather than zero as reduced $722.4 (about 4 percent of proin the longrun case, Table 2 . This was ex-ducer's revenue). The unweighted sum of pected since the supply response associated the welfare effects totals $1,037.4 million, with the intermediate run simulation is more slightly less than the government price supinelastic. port expenditures. The producers' surplus The simulation results indicate little dif-loss varied widely by region. Losses in the ference in the impact of the price support Southeast totaled 1.7 percent of producer reduction across regions. This follows from revenue while losses in the Lake States totaled the assumption that Class I prices adjust with 52 percent of producer revenue. the Minnesota-Wisconsin(M-W) price and thus A $ 2.00 reduction in the support level with with the support level. This assumption ig-frozen Class I prices would have reduced nores the effects of over-order premiums and price support acquisitions by 82 percent to the abilities of producers in some regions to 2361 millon pounds The welfare implicommand these premiums.
6 If over-order precommand these apremiumsts ofer-order pr cations for producers and consumers follow miums reflect the added costs of produ s t associngated with a milk in some regions as well as theost of $1.00 support level reduction coupled fromoving milk into those regions, if deficit,en Class I prices, but the effects are larger and added handler costs in some orders (Babb zen Class I prices, but the effects are larger and added handler costs in some orders (Babb and Bessler) , then a reduction in the support in magnitude. price may not reduce the Class I price but
The welfare implications of this alternative merely raise the over-order premium re-vary widely across regions depending on each ceived by the producer. Over-order premi-region's Class I utilization. Regions with high ums were not considered inthisstudybecause Class I use would be relatively unaffected adequate data on over-order Class I prices while regions with low Class I use are most were not available. In regions with high Class affected. For markets with high Class I uti-II or III utilization, Class I prices would be lization and/or over-order premiums, the expected to change consistent with the sup-model may underestimate the effect of this port level and estimates should accurately program change on PSL and FCSG since it is 6In many cases, the Class I price actually paid the producer is above the federal order Class I minimum price. The difference between the federal order minimum Class I price and the actual Class I price is defined as an overorder premium.
possible that over-order premiums in high become a salable asset (its worth would be Class I utilization markets would be reduced the value of the quota discounted for time somewhat since lower blend prices in regions and risk) and its rent would be lost to the with low Class I use would make transporting purchasing producer. milk to high Class I utilization markets more attractive.
CONCLUSIONS Production Quotas
Since the utility functions of milk producers and consumers and taxpayers are un-A 95 percent production quota (setting known, no "best" policy alternative can be regional quotas at 95 percent of 1981 pro-selected. Even so, some interesting impliduction) would have reduced price support cations can be derived from these results. acquisitions to 6,608 million pounds, a 49 From the producers' perspective, the status percent reduction. Expenditures would have quo is probably the most appealing alterfallen by $1,032.9 million, Table 2 . With a native since all the other alternatives have 90 percent production quota, there would producers' surplus losses. The 90 percent have been no need for price support activity, production quota may be either the most Since the supply function is perfectly in-appealing or least appealing of the alternaelastic at the quota quantity, the interme-tives depending on the distribution of quota diate-run and long-run equilibria do not dif-rents. It is improbable that quota rents would fer. Thus, only the longrun implications are accrue to the milk producer in the long term, reported. Over all regions, a 95 percent quota since the producer initially assigned the quota would have reduced producers' surplus by would likely capture the capitalized quota $1,623.6 million (8.9 percent of revenue), rents as revenue from sales of the quota. Thus, while yielding rent or quota profit of $1,657.9 it would appear that quotas would be atmillion (9.1 percent of revenue) for a net tractive to those initially receiving them but gain to producers of $34.4 million (assuming unattractive to those potential new producers the milk producer captures the rent from the who would have to buy them. quota), Table 1 . Quota rent may exceed proIf the producer were to adopt the premise ducers' surplus loss without implying higher that price support outlays must be reduced ducers' surplus loss without implying higher in order to sustain the political acceptability consumer prices since reduced production of the regulatory system, then based on the results in a higher portion of milk priced at of tregulorysyst t be the-Class I price The unweighted sum of ratio of producers' surplus to price support outlay savings, the assessments would be most welfare effects of a 95 percent quota is appealing overall. A $50 assessment costs $1,067.2 million. With a 90 percent quota, prucers $.53 of producers' surplusforeach producers would have lost $3,160.4 million $1.00 of outlay savings comared to about producers' surplus, but rent to quota would $1.00 for price suppor reductionsand $150 $1.00 for price support reductions and $1.50 have totaled $3,066.7 million. The un-for quotas (assuming quota rent does not weighted sum of the welfare effects totaled accrue to the producer). The reduced price $2,040.3 million.
accrue to the producer). The reduced price $2,040.3 million.
support level with frozen minimum Class I Regionally, the rent attributed to quota was price is the most attractive alternative in the about the same as the loss of producers' Southeast ($.03 loss of Southeast producers' surplus in each region. Thus, producer net surplus to $1.00 reduction in price support gain or loss attributed to the quota would outlays compared to $.06 for assessments) have been small both over all regions and and the least attractive in the Lake States within each region. This assumes the pro-($.28 loss of Lake States producers' surplus ducer owns the quota and is able to capture per $1.00 outlay reduction compared to $.18 the revenue generated by the quota as rent. loss for assessments). This result is due to Initially, the economic rent from the quota differing Class I utilizations in the two rewould probably accrue to the producer since gions. quota would likely be assigned the producer If a policy of lower price support were based on some historical production pattern. adopted, it is probable that in regions with For the quota system to work in the long relatively high Class I utilizations and overterm, it seems probable that some mechanism order premiums, the actual welfare implifor transfer of the quota between producers cation would be near the result associated would be necessary. If so, the quota would with lowered price support and a frozen min-imum Class I price. As previously mentioned, $1.00 assessment would come close. If taxthis is due to the simulation model assump-payer and consumer interests were combined tion in the case of a simple support level, (a logical combination since most taxpayers which is probably inaccurate for some re-are consumers and vice versa), the most atgions. Thus, some producers may support a tractive alternative would be a $2.00 support simple price support level reduction because level reduction since it results in a large gain the welfare implication for their region is of consumers' surplus and elimination of supsimilar to that of a price support reduction port outlays. If taxpayer and producer interwith frozen Class I price.
ests were summed, the $1.00 assessment Consumers would probably support a sim-would be the alternative with the lowest cost ple price support level reduction due to its (with exception of the 95 percent and 90 yield of consumers' surplus. Although the percent quotas when producer capture of the consumers' surplus gain may be less than quota rent is assumed; however, quotas would estimated in some regions (due to the model likely lead to higher milk production costs assumptions on Class I pricing), the gain and more difficult entry into dairying in the associated with a lowered support level with long term). This combination of producer a frozen minimum Class I price is a lower and taxpayer interests may approximate the limit for the increase in consumers' surplus. current political climate where large outlays Thus, a $2.00 support level reduction is have caught the taxpayer's eye and have probably the most appealing to consumers.
brought demands for reductions and proTaxpayers would best be served by a policy ducers' interest groups are lobbying Congress which eliminated price support outlays. for favorable treatment. The recently enacted Either a $2.00 price support decrease or a assessment provisions are consistent with this 90 percent quota would achieve this, and a explanation of the results.
